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Introduction
In the early 1970s, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) put forward the idea that …nan-cial repression -i.e. government imposed controls on lending and deposit rates, capital controls, and directed credit -had a negative impact on investment and growth by suppressing domestic saving and distorting the allocation of credit. While their views were vigorously challenged by a range of critics, 1 their main policy recommendation for …-nancial liberalisation gained momentum among policy makers in both developing and developed countries. As a result, the last forty years have witnessed a gradual removal of …nancial restraints worldwide with increased movement of capital around the globe.
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Both these developments are likely to in ‡uence the behaviour of private investment.
Increased international capital ‡ows are likely to result in a relaxation of borrowing constraints for many …rms, leading to credit expansion. 3 Under fully liberalised conditions the price of credit for many, if not all, …rms will rise, making their investment plans more sensitive to the price of credit and no longer sensitive to the availability of credit. Under partial liberalisation or continued …nancial repression, however, some …rms may continue to have access to subsidised credit while others may have access to more expensive international loans. Does the retention of …nancial restraints under these circumstances deter or promote investment? In other words, once a country moves away from complete …nancial repression -where the only source of credit for private investment is the domestic banking system -can the provision of cheaper, albeit rationed, domestic credit help stimulate private investment? This is the question we address in this paper. In order to do so, we employ a theoretical model of investment which assumes that …rms have access to quantity-constrained domestic loans that are cheaper than those they can obtain from international capital markets. 4 This accommodates the idea that increased international capital ‡ows might 1 See for example, Arestis and Demetriades (1999 ) , Diaz-Alejandro (1985) , Hellman et al. (2000) , Singh (1997) , Stiglitz (1994) , Taylor (1983) , Van Wijnbergen (1983) .
2 Abiad and Mody (2005) document the gradual reduction of …nancial restraints around the world while Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2005) document the increase in …nancial openness. 3 In some circumstances, such credit expansion can also feed consumption and lead to asset price bubbles (see, for example, Gylfason et al. 2010) . 4 The model is based on Demetriades and Devereux (2000) .
have relaxed borrowing constraints for many …rms while, at the same time, some …rms may have continued to bene…t from access to cheaper policy loans. We operationalise the model in a multi-country setting and derive …ve variants of a private investment equation including a baseline neoclassical model without …nancial restraints. To estimate the investment equations, we employ recently developed nonstationary panel methodologies that allow for cross-sectional dependence across countries. The presence of dependence across countries is a plausible hypothesis in a world characterised by growing real and …nancial inter-linkages, which we test by appropriate econometric procedures.
Our sample includes 20 developing countries over the period 1972-2000. The econometric analysis consists of three steps. First, unit root tests for cross-sectionally dependent panels are applied. Second, the existence of a cointegrating relationship among the variables is investigated, fully allowing for cross-section dependence. Third, the Fully Modi…ed Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) estimator developed by Bai and Kao (2006) is used to estimate the investment equations. We contrast our results with those obtained using the pooled FMOLS estimator of Pedroni (2000) which assumes cross-sectional independence.
Our …ndings con…rm the importance of taking into account cross-country dependence. We …nd that when we allow for cross-sectional dependence, investment displays more sensitivity to world capital market conditions and exchange rate uncertainty.
Perhaps more surprisingly, we …nd that 'repressing' domestic real interest rates resulted in higher levels of private investment than those that would have been obtained under more 'liberalised' conditions. This …nding, which contrasts sharply with the McKinnon-Shaw prediction, complements a growing literature on the possible negative e¤ects of …nancial liberalisation on the channels of economic growth. Stiglitz
(1994) provides a unifying theoretical rationale for such e¤ects, drawing on information asymmetries in …nancial markets which provide scope for meaningful government interventions. Singh (1997) , drawing on Keynes (1936) and a large body of empirical evidence, emphasises the negative e¤ects that emanate from stock market volatility. Demetriades and Luintel (2001) provide evidence of positive e¤ects of …nancial re-straints on South Korea's …nancial development, re ‡ecting lack of competition in the banking system. More recently, Andrianova et al. (2008 and 2010) provide evidence suggesting that bank privatisation -one of the main pillars of …nancial liberalisationhas been negatively associated with both …nancial development and growth, re ‡ecting poor regulation. Last but not least, recent work by Ang (2010) suggests that …nan-cial liberalisation had a negative e¤ect on technological deepening by distorting the allocation of human capital.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the modelling framework.
Section 3 discusses econometric methodology and empirical results. Section 4 summarises and concludes.
2 The modelling framework
Theoretical underpinnings
The dynamic investment equations estimated in this paper are based on the theoretical model put forward by Demetriades and Devereux (2000) , henceforth D&D. D&D use a microeconomic model of a representative …rm's investment decision under …nancial restraints as their starting point. The model suggests a structural relationship between the optimal capital stock and the 'modi…ed'cost of capital which is then used to derive a long-run theory-consistent aggregate investment equation that takes into account the presence of …nancial restraints. The rest of this section provides a brief outline of the D&D approach.
The main assumption of D&D is that the o¢ cial banking system is unable to satisfy the entire demand for investible funds because of the presence of an interest rate ceiling which restricts the supply of funds à la McKinnon-Shaw (see also Fry, 1994) . The model departs from the McKinnon-Shaw tradition, however, in that it assumes the existence of an 'alternative'…nancial market in which …rms can borrow freely, albeit
at an interest rate that is higher than the o¢ cial lending rate. Their interpretation of the alternative market is that it is the world capital market although it could also be interpreted as the uno¢ cial credit market, or 'curb', market (see Taylor, 1983 and Van Wijnebergen, 1983) . There are theoretical and empirical reasons for us preferring the …rst interpretation to the second, not least the stylised facts relating to the increased international capital ‡ows alluded to in the introduction. Thus, we assume that …rms have access to two types of borrowing: domestic bank borrowing and international loans. Rationing of domestic loans to di¤erent …rms is assumed to depend on the availability of collateral which is related to the …rm's capital stock.
The representative …rm is assumed to maximize the wealth of its shareholders given by the present discounted value of dividends (D t ). The nominal discount rate used in determining the present value is the one which is obtained in the world capital market, denoted i t , since this is the rate at which shareholders are assumed to be able to borrow or lend as much as they wish. 5 Note that the …rm takes both the domestic lending rate i t and the world interest rate i t as determined exogenously in the appropriate market.
Moreover, the …rm is assumed to be able to raise …nance only through borrowing or retained earnings.
Formally, the optimisation problem can be stated as:
(1 + i l 1 ) 1 ; subject to the following constraints:
where E t f:g is the expectations operator, q t Y t represents current revenue, where q t is the price of output in period t and Y t is output, and where the latter is a function of the capital stock at the beginning of the period, The …rst two constraints are standard in models of …rm investment. The …rst constraint is the ‡ow of funds identity for the …rm and the second constraint is the equation of motion of the capital stock. The third constraint is speci…c to D&D; it constrains the supply of domestic bank loans in the domestic market to be a proportion,
x t , of the value of the …rm's capital stock. The capital stock, therefore, represents collateral; banks are willing to lend more to large …rms than to small …rms.
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Taking …rst-order conditions together yields
This states that, in equilibrium, the expected marginal revenue product of capital is equal to a modi…ed cost of capital. The modi…ed cost of capital consists of: the …nancial cost at the rate in the international market i t p t ; plus the cost of the fall in the value of the asset E t p t+1 ; minus the expected capital gain term, E t p t+1 p t ; plus the …nal term which re ‡ects the reduction in the standard cost of capital relative to the international capital market. This …nal term shows the cheaper source of …nance which is available at rate i t but acknowledges that only a proportion x jt can be …nanced in this way.
Equation (5) holds for every …rm in the economy in the steady-state. D&D show that the same relationship will be observed in the economy as a whole providing that 6 Stocks dated t refer to the end of period t, equivalent to the beginning of period t + 1. 7 In both markets, the model assumes that the nominal interest rate is set at the time the borrowing takes place. Thus, for example, the interest rate applying to o¢ cial borrowing at the beginning of period t (the end of period t 1, denoted B t 1 ) is determined at the beginning of the period and hence denoted i t 1 .
8 Note that …rms cannot borrow from the domestic market to lend on the international market.
certain aggregation conditions are satis…ed and that …rm-speci…c shocks to the proportion of a …rm's capital stock …nanced out of bank loans cancel out across …rms. The steady-state relationship can be embedded in a dynamic model that explains aggregate behaviour by assuming that investment is driven by the di¤erence between the actual marginal product of capital and its equilibrium level based on (5). Additional dynamics would be generated by time lags in decision-making, ordering, delivery, installation of new capital, and so on. The dynamic investment equation corresponding to (5) is then given by
: (6) where the subscript j refers to …rm j. The term Y t =K t 1 is interpreted as a proxy for the marginal product of capital and the modi…ed cost of capital is split into two components: the real interest rate in the world capital market and the term capturing …nancial restraints.
Since we expect investment to depend on the di¤erence between the marginal prod- 
Operationalising the model in a multi-country analysis
There are three variables in equation (6) that are not directly observed and require modelling assumptions to be made to operationalise the model in a multi-country empirical analysis, the capital stock, the world capital market interest rate and the …nancial restraints dummy. The construction of the …rst is based on the perpetual inventory method given by expression (3). 9 The interest rate i used here is the US lending rate. Given the sample of countries we are using, we believe that the US rate is the most appropriate rate to approximate the cost of loans from the world market.
The expected in ‡ation series are in turn proxied by the current in ‡ation rate prevailing in each country. The …nancial restraints dummy is based on nominal interest rate di¤erential i i. In the theoretical model, the supply of bank loans becomes rationed only if i exceeds i. This suggests that an observation could be considered as being under conditions of '…nancial restraints' if i i > 0. Five variants of Equation (6) are estimated to allow some ‡exibility in the way that …nancial restraints are de…ned and to capture the possible e¤ects of exchange rate risk.
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The …rst model is a "Neo-Classical" investment equation -denoted N C-which corresponds to a world without …nancial restraints (b j4 = 0):
where the subscript j refers to country j and the error term is IID(0; 2 j ) across time but may be correlated across countries as a result of common real or …nancial shocks.
The second model -denoted F R A -tests the …nancial restraints hypothesis assuming that all the countries always operate under conditions of …nancial restraints:
The initial capital stock for each country was constructed by using
is the depreciation rate, assumed to be 4%. 10 Although for tractability reasons, exchange rate risk is not explicitly taken into account in the underlying theoretical model, in reality this may deter domestic …rms from borrowing in international markets.
The third model -denoted F R D -also accommodates the possible e¤ect of …nancial restraint but the …nancial restraints term is now interacted with D jt , a dummy variable that equals 1 when an observation is considered as being under condition of …nancial restraints (as de…ned above) and 0 otherwise:
The fourth model -denoted F R A (unrestricted) "unbundles" the …nancial restraints term into its two components, the real interest rate di¤erential and the in ‡ation rate di¤erential:
The …fth model -denoted FR-ER-introduces a measure of exchange rate uncertainty to capture the risk associated with international borrowing by domestic …rms, which may have a negative e¤ect on investment:
where SDEX jt is the 3-year moving average of the standard deviation of the domestic exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar.
Econometric methodology and empirical results
The empirical analysis consists of three steps. In the …rst step, we test for nonstationarity in the data using the testing procedures developed by Bai and Ng (2004) for no cointegration between the defactored data can be conducted using standard panel tests for no cointegration such as those of Pedroni (1999) and Pedroni (2004) .
Cointegration between Y i;t and X i;t is found only when the tests for both the common factors and the idiosyncratic components reject the null of no cointegration.
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In the third step, we estimate the long-relationship among the variables of interest in the …ve models under consideration using the continuous-update fully modi…ed (CUP-FM) estimator developed Bai and Kao (2006) . These authors discuss the lim- 
where^
denote the sample estimate of the pair-wise correlation of the residuals e it from the regression of any variable of interest on an intercept, a linear trend and a lagged dependent variable for each country i. CD test results are reported in Table 1 . Clear evidence of cross-sectional dependence is found since the null hypothesis of no crosscorrelation is strongly rejected. 13 For more details see Bai and Kao (2006) . 14 See Appendix C for the results of the Monte Carlo simulations that con…rm this. For further details on the CIPS test and the t a and t b statistics see Pesaran (2007) and Moon and Perron (2004) respectively. 15 One common factor is also selected when the other information criteria proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) are considered.
16 See Ng (2004, p.1133) .
where F t indicates an r 1 vector of common factors. The ADF tests results for the extracted common factor provide evidence of a unit root in all the variables. To test the stationarity of the idiosyncratic component, Bai and Ng (2004) propose pooling individual ADF t-statistics with de-factored estimated components e it in the model with no deterministic trend
The pooled tests are based on Fisher-type statistics de…ned as in Maddala and Wu (1999) and in Choi (2001) . Let P ĉ e (i) be the p-value of the ADF t-statistics for the i-th cross-section unit, ADF ĉ e (i), then the standardised Choi-type statistics is:
The previous statistic converges for (N; T ! 1) to a standard normal distribution.
In our analysis, we use the Fisher-type statistic de…ned as in Choi (2001) . The pooled p-value inverse normal tests do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all the variables, providing strong evidence of nonstationarity. Similarly, the results obtained with the tests developed by Pesaran (2007) and Moon and Perron (2004) , which are more powerful in small samples, show that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for all the variables.
Since the panel no cointegration hypothesis can be rejected only if the tests for both the common factors and the idiosyncratic components reject the null of no cointegration (see Gengenbach et al., 2006, pp. 698-99) , we apply the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 to the defactored data and the Johansen (1988) trace test to the common factor components. The results are reported in Table 3 . For the panel tests, we use two statistics proposed by Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 . The …rst statistic is a panel version of a non-parametric statistic that is analogous to the familiar Phillips and Perron rho-statistic, Z . The second is a parametric statistic which is analogous to the familiar ADF t-statistic, Z t . These tests assume the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative that all units (countries) share a common cointegrating vector. The results of these tests provide evidence of a common cointegrating vector for the whole panel. With regard to the common factor components, a cointegrating relationship is found with the Johansen (1998) trace test in all the models.
Having found evidence of cointegration in each of the models, we …rst estimate these models using the FMOLS estimator proposed by Pedroni (2004) under the assumption of cross-sectional independence. Table 4 e¤ect which suggests that high in ‡ation has a negative e¤ect on investment because it depresses the supply of investable funds. However, the mechanism here is a di¤erent one. The in ‡ation component of the …nancial restraints term captures the part of the low nominal interest rate that is due to low in ‡ation. If domestic in ‡ation is lower than world in ‡ation, domestic nominal interest rates are low relative to the world capital market and this reduces the cost of capital associated with domestic loans. Model FR-ER, which includes the two exchange rate uncertainty variables, suggests that both terms capturing exchange rate uncertainty are negative as expected, although only one of the two -b 5 -is signi…cant at the 5% level while the other one -b 6 -is insigni…cant. Thus, there is some evidence that exchange rate uncertainty depresses domestic investment.
However, one may argue that the assumption of cross-sectional independence is unrealistic in a world characterised by growing real and …nancial inter-linkages. In order to check for cross-sectional dependence in the estimates, we compute the long- Since evidence of cross-sectional dependence is found, we use the CUP-FM estimator of Bai and Kao (2006) , which allows for cross-sectional dependence through common factors. Table 5 reports the estimation results. Allowing for cross-country effects impacts on both the magnitude and signi…cance of various coe¢ cients and alters the economic interpretation of some of the results. The term proxying the marginal product of capital (b 2 ) is once again always positive and strongly signi…cant but its coe¢ cient is much larger compared to the estimates obtained assuming cross-sectional independence. The coe¢ cient of the world interest rate (b 3 ) remains negative and signi…cant in all the models, but once again the estimated coe¢ cients are much larger -hovering around 0:25 compared to 0:08 in Table 4 -suggesting that domestic investment appears to be much more responsive to world capital markets if one allows for cross-country e¤ects. Remarkably, all the …nancial restraints terms remain positive but are now statistically signi…cant at the 5% level, which now suggests that …nancial restraints do play an important role in determining investment. In Model FR A , the unbundled …nancial restraints term -b 4 -is positive and signi…cant with a coe¢ cient that has more or less the same size as the one on the world interest rate. The positive coe¢ cient suggests that depressing the domestic interest rate through …nancial restraints results in additional domestic investment, in contrast to the McKinnon-Shaw prediction. In Model FR D , which interacts the …nancial restraints term with the …-nancial restraints dummy, the coe¢ cient on …nancial restraints (b 4 ) is more than twice the size of the world interest rate coe¢ cient. This suggests that countries in which …nancial restraints were present are, in fact, the ones that may have bene…ted from low domestic interest rates. Model FR A (unrestricted), which unbundles the interest rate di¤erential into its two components does, however, provide some comfort to supporters of the McKinonn-Shaw hypothesis in that it continues to show, as in Table   4 , the positive e¤ects of low in ‡ation on investment. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of the real interest rate di¤erential is now positive and signi…cant at the 5% level, suggesting that depressing the real interest rate to below world levels has a positive e¤ect on The results also suggest that exchange rate uncertainty is an even more important determinant of investment if one takes into account cross-country e¤ects. Both terms capturing exchange rate uncertainty (b 5 and b 6 ) are now signi…cant at the 5% level and their coe¢ cients are more than twice the absolute size compared to those reported in Table 4 .
Summary and Conclusion
This paper Our …ndings, therefore, demonstrate the importance of cross-country e¤ects in estimating investment models. In addition, they suggest that countries that managed to suppress domestic real interest rates without generating high in ‡ation enjoyed higher levels of private investment than those that would have been obtained under liberalised conditions. There is, of course, a limit to the extent that real interest rates can be depressed by applying nominal interest rate ceilings without resorting to in ‡ationary policies. When low real interest rates are the result of high in ‡ation, private investment it seems does not appear to increase. Thus, while mild …nancial repression can stimulate private investment, severe repression through high in ‡ation may well have the opposite e¤ect.
Our …ndings highlight two new avenues for further research. Firstly, they suggest that cross-country studies of private investment and possibly other macroeconomic aggregates need to take into account cross-country e¤ects. Secondly, they suggest that it may be fruitful to re-examine the e¤ects of …nancial repression on other key macroeconomic aggregates using the kind of techniques we have used in this paper. Pesaran (2007) . The truncated version is applied as suggested by Pesaran (2007) . The appropriate lag-length for CIPS is selected using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) with a maximum number of lags equal to 4. t a and t b are the two statistics developed by Moon and Perron (2004) . p-values are in parenthesis. Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 Notes: Sample period 1972-2000. The standard errors in parenthesis are computed using a sieve bootstrap procedure (see Fachin, 2004; Chang et al., 2006) . y denotes signi…cance at the 5% level. Notes: Sample period 1972-2000. The standard errors in parenthesis are computed using a sieve bootstrap procedure (see Fachin, 2004; Chang et al., 2006) . y denotes signi…cance at the 5% level.
